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Abstract
Let T be a second-order arithmetical theory, Λ a well-order, λ < Λ
and X ⊆ N. We use [λ|X]ΛTϕ as a formalization of “ϕ is provable from T
and an oracle for the set X, using ω-rules of nesting depth at most λ”.
For a set of formulas Γ, define predicative oracle reflection for T over
Γ (Pred-O-RFNT [Γ]) to be the schema that asserts that, if X ⊆ N, Λ is a
well-order and ϕ ∈ Γ, then
∀λ<Λ ([λ|X]ΛTϕ→ ϕ).
In particular, define predicative oracle consistency (Pred-O-Cons(T )) as
Pred-O-RFNT [{0 = 1}].
Our main result is as follows. Let ATR0 be the second-order theory
of Arithmetic Transfinite Recursion, RCA∗0 be Weakened Recursive Com-
prehension and ACA be Arithmetic Comprehension with Full Induction.
Then,
ATR0 ≡ RCA
∗
0 + Pred-O-Cons(RCA
∗
0) ≡ RCA
∗
0 + Pred-O-RFNACA[Π
1
2].
We may even replace RCA∗0 by the weaker ECA0, the second-order ana-
logue of Elementary Arithmetic.
Thus we characterize ATR0, a theory often considered to embody
Predicative Analysis, in terms of strong reflection and consistency princi-
ples.
Keywords: Reflection principles; Fragments of second-order arithmetic; Pred-
icative analysis; Reverse mathematics
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1 Introduction
Reflection over a theory T roughly says that whatever is provable in T is actually
true. As such, reflection is natural from a methodological or philosophical point
of view. Moreover, from a technical point of view it also turns out to be natural,
since various well-known fragments of arithmetic can be re-cast in terms of
reflection principles. In this introduction we will discuss results along these
lines for first-order arithmetical theories and address the question of how this
can be extended beyond first-order theories.
1.1 Reflection, consistency and fragments of first-order
arithmetic
Fix a formal theory T . If we denote the formal provability of a formula ϕ in
T by Tϕ, we can write Rfn(T ), called local reflection over T , as the scheme
Tϕ→ ϕ, where ϕ has no free variables.
It turns out that a better-behaved notion of reflection is so-called uniform
reflection where we allow for formulas, possibly with parameters. This scheme,
denoted RFN(T ), is given by
∀x
(
Tϕ(x˙)→ ϕ(x)
)
, (1)
where ϕ is any formula and x˙ means that we must replace x by a name for x.
Let us denote the consistency of T + ϕ by ♦Tϕ, which is equivalent to
¬T¬ϕ. By Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem we know that consis-
tent computably enumerable (c.e.) theories T do not even prove the weakest
instances of reflection; if we define ⊥ by 0 = 1, we know that
T 0 T⊥ → ⊥,
since the latter is provably equivalent to the consistency of T .
Thus, adding reflection to a consistent base theory will yield a proper ex-
tension of it. This is philosophically appealing, since one can sustain that it is
natural to accept reflection over T once one has accepted T . An early result
by Kreisel and Levy [12] shows that reflection principles are also natural from
a technical point of view in that adding them yields natural extensions. Be-
low, PA denotes the well-known first-order theory Peano Arithmetic and PRA
refers to Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, which is often considered to embody
Hilbert’s concept of finitist mathematics [18].
Theorem 1.1 (Kreisel, Levy (1968)). PRA+ RFN(PRA) ≡ PA.
This relation between reflection and a system of arithmetic can be extended
to fragments of Peano arithmetic. By Σ0n –or simply Σn in this introduction–
we denote first-order arithmetical formulas of the form ∃xn∀xn−1 . . . ϕ, where
ϕ only has bounded quantifiers (see Section 2.1). The theory IΣn is the theory
of arithmetic where apart from the basic axioms for + and × we have induction
axioms (
∀ y<x ϕ(y, z)→ ϕ(x, z)
)
→ ∀x ϕ(x, z)
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for all Σn-formulas.
Leivant [13] proved that there is a correspondence between the principles IΣn
for n ≥ 2 and restricted reflection principles over PRA. Restricted reflection
principles arise when we restrict the formulas in the reflection schema. If Γ
is a set of formulas, RFNΓ(T ), denotes the restriction of (1) where ϕ(x) ∈ Γ.
Beklemishev [2] extended Leviant’s result to the case n = 1 by lowering the base
theory from PRA to a somewhat weaker theory EA called Kalmar Elementary
Arithmetic.
Theorem 1.2. Given n ≥ 1, EA+ RFNΣn+1(EA) ≡ IΣn.
This theorem shows that reflection principles can be related to fragments
of arithmetic. Moreover, for various notions of provability one can often link
reflection to consistency statements. This relation is normally proved in the
way presented in Lemma 1.4 below, where we need to require some minimal
properties of the particular provability predicate, leading to the notion of normal
provability predicate.
Definition 1.3. We will call a predicate  a normal provability predicate if it
is provable in EA that  satisfies the modal logic K; that is,
EA ⊢ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ),
EA ⊢ (ϕ) for any tautology ϕ, and EA ⊢ ϕ implies that EA ⊢ ϕ.
For Γ a set of formulas, let ¬Γ denote the set {¬γ | γ ∈ Γ}. A predicate 
is provably ∆-complete in U if U ⊢ δ → δ for any δ ∈ ∆.
Lemma 1.4. Let U be a theory extending elementary arithmetic and let  be a
normal provability predicate with dual consistency predicate . If Γ contains (a
provable equivalence of) ⊥ and  is provably ¬Γ-complete in U , then Γ-reflection
for  is equivalent to ⊤. That is,
U + {γ → γ | γ ∈ Γ} ≡ U + ⊤.
Proof. The ⊢ direction follows directly since ⊥ ∈ Γ. The other direction follows
directly from ¬Γ-completeness: suppose that γ and ⊤ and suppose for a con-
tradiction that ¬γ; by completeness we have ¬γ, whence by γ and normality
we get ⊥, which contradicts ⊤.
Stronger notions of provability can be related to stronger notions of consis-
tency. For this purpose it is very useful to consider the provability predicates
[n]T for n ∈ N and c.e. theories T where [n]T is a natural first-order formaliza-
tion of “provable from the axioms of T together with some true Πn sentence”,
where a formula is Πn if its negation is Σn. More precisely, let TrueΠn be the
standard partial truth-predicate for Πn formulas, which is itself of complexity
Πn. Then, we define
[n]Tϕ↔ ∃π
(
TrueΠn(π) ∧T (π → ϕ)
)
.
It is well-known that each such predicate is normal and the following observation
follows directly from the definition.
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Observation 1.5. For T a c.e. theory extending EA and n ∈ N, the predicate
[n]T is Πn-complete.
From this observation, together with Lemma 1.4, we get that
T + 〈n〉T⊤ ≡ T + {∀x
(
[n]Tσ(x˙)→ σ(x)
)
| σ ∈ Σn}. (2)
We can easily relate the reflection principle from this equation (2) to a more
standard notion of reflection in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.6. For T a c.e. theory extending EA we have
T + { ∀x
(
[n]Tσ(x˙)→ σ(x)
)
| σ ∈ Σn} ≡ T + RFNΣn(T ).
Proof. “⊇” Reason in T + { ∀x
(
[n]Tσ(x˙) → σ(x)
)
| σ ∈ Σn} and fix some
σ ∈ Σn so that Tσ. Then certainly [n]Tσ, whence σ, by reflection.
“⊆” Reason in T + RFNΣn(T ) and fix some σ ∈ Σn such that [n]Tσ. Then,
for some (possibly non-standard) Πn sentence we have that TrueΠn(π) and
T (TrueΠn(π)→ σ). Since TrueΠn(π)→ σ is provably equivalent to a Σn sen-
tence we obtain TrueΠn(π)→ σ by reflection. Since by assumption TrueΠn(π),
we conclude σ.
From this lemma, together with (2) and Lemma 1.2 we see the intimate
relation between reflection, consistency statements and fragments of first-order
arithmetic.
Theorem 1.7. Given n > 0,
EA+ 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤ ≡ EA+ RFNΣn+1(EA) ≡ IΣn.
1.2 Ordinal analysis beyond first-order
Ignatiev showed in [9] that for a large variety of theories T , the joint behav-
ior of the provability predicates [n]T can be described and fully understood via
a relatively simple and well-behaved modal logic called GLP, first studied by
Japaridze in [10]. Theorem 1.7 is a clear witness of the expressiveness of this
modal logic; as a matter of fact, Beklemishev has shown in [3] that the compu-
tation of a proof-theoretical Π01 ordinal for PA along the lines of Schmerl’s work
[15] on transfinitely adding consistency to a weak base theory can be realized
largely within this modal logic GLP.
In comparison to the more established Π11 or Π
0
2 analyses of a formal the-
ory T , its Π01 analysis is more fine-grained and is more intimately tied to the
notion of consistency. The ordinals involved in the analysis actually are natu-
rally represented within the logic GLP by worms, which are iterated consistency
statements of the form 〈n1〉 . . . 〈nm〉⊤.
However, worms in GLP correspond to ordinals below ε0, so GLP would
certainly not suffice for the analysis of theories which are substantially stronger
than PA. Thus, to extend the relation between ordinals and modal-logical terms
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beyond ε0, first steps were made in [4, 5, 7] by studying logics GLPΛ that contain
for each ordinal α < Λ a modality [α]. Observation 1.5 suggests that one should
go beyond first-order theories in order to interpret GLPΛ and in [6] two of the
authors provide an interpretation of GLPΛ within second-order arithmetic.
Our present goal is to provide analogues of Theorem 1.7 for fragments of
second-order arithmetic, using more powerful reflection principles. These prin-
ciples will require reasoning about arbitrary sets, which poses a challenge in a
proof-theoretic setting. Every natural number can be represented by a closed
term; however, it is of course not the case that each set can be denoted by a
syntactical name in any countable language.
In [1] this problem was addressed by resorting to a richer language with
sufficiently many names around. Our way to surpass this complication is by
introducing and studying what we call oracle provability which allows us to
reason in a formalized setting about externally quantified sets. In particular,
we will introduce a new first-order predicate O which we shall call the oracle
predicate and which will be used to reason formally about arbitrary sets.
Once a workable relation between reflection principles and fragments of arith-
metic has been established, this will constitute a significant step forward in the
Π01 ordinal analysis and semi-finitary consistency proofs of second-order theo-
ries as anticipated in [11]. We believe that this paper makes an important step
towards this goal.
1.3 Overview of the paper
In Section 2 we will settle our notation and nomenclature and fix the formal
language that we will work in. One new ingredient is the first-order oracle
symbol O which will, in a way, provide a name for any arbitrary set. We
define formalized oracle provability in this new language and mention some
basic properties.
In Section 3 we will define the fragments of second-order arithmetic which
are relevant for this paper and in section 4 we formalize within these fragments
the notion [λ|X ]ΛT of provability in T using an oracle for X and at most λ <
Λ iterations of the ω-rule. Next, in Section 5 we define and prove the basic
properties of the notions of reflection and consistency based the provability
predicates [λ|X ]ΛT .
In Section 6 we define the notions of predicative oracle reflection and con-
sistency. Basically, predicative oracle reflection/consistency is the statement
that “if Λ is a well-order, then we have reflection/consistency for iterations of
the ω-rule along Λ with an oracle for X”. The section proves that ATR0, the
second-order system of Arithmetic Transfinite Recursion, can be proven from
predicative consistency. Finally, Section 7 proves the converse implication so
that we end up with a characterization of ATR0 in terms of predicative oracle
reflection and conistency.
We know from the literature that PA ≡ {〈n〉⊤ | n < ω}. Our results show
that ATR0 can similarly be reduced to sufficiently strong consistency or reflec-
tion principles. Using slightly suggestive notation, one can paraphrase our result
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as
ATR0 ≡ ECA0 + “{α-OracleCons(ECA0) | α a well-order}”,
where ECA0 is the second-order pendant of EA.
2 Second-order theories with oracles
In this section we will define the fragments of second-order arithmetic which
are relevant for this paper. Moreover, we will formalize a notion of provability
where we use an oracle symbol which provides a name for an arbitrary set much
like one has numerals to name natural numbers.
2.1 Conventions of syntax
We will work mainly in the language L2 of second-order arithmetic, with primi-
tive symbols 0, 1,+ω,×ω, <ω,=,∈, and a term x
y for exponentiation represent-
ing the standard constants, operations and relations on the natural numbers.
We use the subindex ω because we will be interested in different linear orders
throughout the text and thus do not want to reserve these symbols for their
standard use. However, we will omit such subindices whenever this does not
lead to confusion.
We fix some primitive recursive Go¨del numbering, mapping a formula ψ ∈ L2
to its corresponding Go¨del number pψq, and similarly for terms and sequents of
formulas (used to represent derivations). We will assume that the Go¨del num-
bering is natural in that the Go¨del number of a strict substring is numerically
smaller than the Go¨del number of the entire string.
Moreover, we fix some set of numerals which are terms so that each natural
number n is denoted by exactly one numeral written as n. Since we will be
working mainly inside theories of arithmetic, we will often identify ψ with pψq
or even with pψq for that matter.
As is customary, we use∆00 to denote the set of all formulas (possibly with set
parameters but without the occurrence of O) where no second-order quantifiers
appear and all first-order quantifiers are “bounded”, that is, of the form ∀x <ω
y ϕ or ∃x <ω y ϕ. We simultaneously define Σ
0
0 = Π
0
0 = ∆
0
0 and recursively
define Σ0n+1 to be the set of all formulas of the form ∃x0 . . . ∃xmϕ with ϕ ∈ Π
0
n,
and similarly Π0n+1 to be the set of all formulas of the form ∀x0 . . .∀xmϕ with
ϕ ∈ Σ0n. We denote by Π
0
ω the union of all Π
0
n; these are the arithmetic
formulas.
The classes Σ1n,Π
1
n are defined analogously but using second-order quanti-
fiers and setting Σ10 = Π
1
0 =∆
1
0 = Π
0
ω. It is well-known that every second-order
formula is equivalent to another in one of the above forms. We use a lightface
font for the analogous classes where no set-variables appear free: ∆mn ,Π
m
n ,Σ
m
n .
The set of free variable of a formula ϕ will be denoted by FV(ϕ).
We may also wish to enrich these classes with new formulas. If θ(x1, . . . , xn)
is any formula, we define Πmn (θ),Σ
m
n (θ), etc. as above, except that we add any
substitution instance θ(t1, . . . , tn) as if it were an atomic formula. If θ is of
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the form x ∈ Y , we may write Γ(Y ) instead of Γ(θ). We may similarly define
Γ(θ1, . . . , θn) when adding multiple formulas as atomic. As a special case we
mention Γ(O), when the oracle is allowed to appear.
We will say a theory T is elementarily representable or simply representable
if it provably contains predicate logic, is closed under Modus Ponens, and there
is a ∆00 formula ProofT (x, y) which holds if and only if x codes a derivation in
T of a formula coded by y.
We will also use the following pseudo-terms to simplify notation, where an
expression ϕ(t(~x)) should be seen as a shorthand for ∃y <ω s(~x)(ψ(~x, y)∧ϕ(y)),
with ψ is a ∆00 formula defining the graph of the intended interpretation of t
and s a standard term bounding the values of t(~x):
1. A term 〈x, y〉 which returns a code of the ordered pair formed by x and y
and projection terms so that (〈x, y〉)0 = x and (〈x, y〉)1 = y.
2. A term x[y/z] which, when x codes a formula ϕ(v), y a variable v and z
a term t, returns the code of ϕ(t). Otherwise, its value is unspecified, for
example it could be the default p⊥q.
3. A term x → y which, when x, y are codes for ϕ, ψ, returns a code of
ϕ→ ψ, and similarly for other Booleans and quantifiers.
4. A term x mapping a natural number to the code of its numeral.
5. For every formula ϕ and variables x0, . . . , xm, a term ϕ(x˙0, . . . , x˙m) which,
given natural numbers n0, . . . , nm, returns the code of the outcome of
ϕ[~x/~¯n], i.e., the code of ϕ(n¯0, . . . , n¯m).
6. A designated unary predicate O(·) which we will use to represent an “or-
acle”.
The only purpose of using these pseudo-terms is to shorten complex formulas
for the sake of legibility. We write Tϕ(x˙0, . . . , x˙n) as shorthand for ∃ψ (ψ =
ϕ(x˙0, . . . , x˙n) ∧ Tψ) and adhere to the same convention when using other
notions of provability.
We will also use the notation for these terms in the metalanguage, as we
have already seen with our notation for numerals. An exception to this is the
usage of O which will involved when representing sets in a formalized setting.
All the classes of formulas Γ we consider do not contain the symbol O unless
we explicitly mention otherwise, using the notation Γ(O) defined below.
2.2 Oracle provability
The oracle O will be used to add information about any set of numbers to our
theory T . To be precise, given a set A ⊆ N, define T |A to be the theory
T + {O(n) : n ∈ A} + {¬O(n) : n 6∈ A} + {∃X ∀x
(
x∈X ↔ O(x)
)
}.
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It should be clear that if T is representable then T |A has a ∆00(A) axiomati-
zation (i.e., the only set variable that may appear is A) and provability in T |A
is Σ01(A). To be more precise, there exist formulas AxiomT |A(x,A) ∈ ∆
0
0(A), as
well as ProofT |A(x, y, A) ∈ ∆
0
0(A), and T |A(x,A) ∈ Σ
0
1(X) so that
ϕ is an axiom of T |A ⇔ N |= AxiomT |A(pϕq, A),
π is a proof of ϕ in the theory T |A ⇔ N |= ProofT |A(pπq, pϕq, A) and,
T |A ⊢ ϕ ⇔ N |= T |A(pϕq, A).
For example, we can define
AxiomT |A(ϕ,A) := AxiomT (ϕ) ∨ ∃x<ϕ (ϕ = pO(x)q ∧ x ∈ X)
∨ ∃x<ϕ (ϕ = p¬O(x)q ∧ x /∈ X)
∨ ϕ = p∃X ∀x
(
x∈X ↔ O(x)
)
q,
so that ProofT |A(d, ϕ) will just become as ProofT (d, ϕ) where every occurrence
of AxiomT (π) for some π is replaced by AxiomT |A(π,A). As before, we define
T |Aϕ by ∃x ProofT |A(x, ϕ). When working in T |A we will write x ∈ A instead
of O(x), provided this does not lead to confusion. As is standard, one may use
a single set to represent sets A1, . . . , An by {〈i, x〉 : x ∈ Ai}, and as such we will
freely use our oracle to interpret tuples of sets. If working on T |A1, . . . , An we
will write x ∈ Ai instead of O(〈i, x〉).
The oracle O is a technical tool to be able to talk about sets under the scope
of a box. For example, it is immediate that for any theory T , we provably have
∀X ∀x
(
x ∈ X → T |X x˙ ∈ X
)
.
However, a word of warning is due here. The “bar” notation we have introduced
is informal and will only be used when it does not lead to ambiguity. In particu-
lar, nested uses of oracle provability could lead to confusion. Certain principles
will go through for iterated oracle provability like x ∈ X → T |XT |X x˙ ∈ X.
Note that in this context, “T |X” refers to provability in the theory whose
axioms are given by
AxiomT (ϕ) ∨ ∃x<ϕ (ϕ = pO(x)q ∧O(x)) ∨ ∃x<ϕ (ϕ = p¬O(x)q ∧ ¬O(x))
∨ϕ = p∃X ∀x
(
x∈X ↔ O(x)
)
q.
Since we use only one first-order symbol O to write play the role of an oracle, in
our framework the X in x ∈ X in for example T |X
(
x ∈ X → T |X x˙ ∈ X
)
is
really given at the top level and not at “one level of provability deep”. As such
we should be very careful in working with iterations of oracle provability and
there are various other subtleties too. However, for the purpose of this paper
these subtleties are not salient and we shall only be concerned with non-nested
occurrences of provability.
Finally, we mention that we would like to make inferences like T |X ϕ(X)⇒
T |X ∃Xϕ(X). This is why in T |X we have included the axiom ∃X ∀x (x ∈
X ↔ O(x)).
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3 Fragments of second-order arithmetic
Important fragments of second-order arithmetic are typically characterized by
their set-existence axioms. In this section we shall revisit the fragments which
are relevant for this paper.
3.1 Comprehension and Induction
It is important in this paper to keep track of the second-order principles that
are used; below we describe the most basic ones. Here, < denotes the standard
ordering on the naturals:
Γ-CA ∃X∀x
(
x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(x)
)
where ϕ ∈ Γ and X is not free in ϕ;
IΓ ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1)
)
→ ∀x ϕ(x) where ϕ ∈ Γ;
Ind 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x
(
x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X
)
→ ∀x (x ∈ X).
We assume all theories extend two-sorted classical first-order logic, so that they
include Modus Ponens, Generalization, etc., as well as Robinson’s Arithmetic
Q, i.e. Peano Arithmetic without induction.
In the list below, recall that we have included exponentiation in our language,
which is essential for the weaker theories.
ECA0 : Q + Ind+∆
0
0-CA;
RCA∗0 : Q + Ind+∆
0
1-CA;
RCA0 : Q + IΣ
0
1+∆
0
1-CA;
ACA0 : Q + Ind+Π
0
ω-CA;
ACA : Q + IΠ1ω+Π
0
ω-CA.
We mention these from weakest to strongest but note that ACA0 is still a rela-
tively weak subsystem of second-order arithmetic, being arithmetcially conser-
vative over PA. It will later be useful to observe the following (see [16, Lemma
VIII.1.5]):
Theorem 3.1. RCA0 and ACA0 are finitely axiomatizable.
The system ECA0 stands for Elementary Comprehension Axiom and was
introduced in [6] as the second-order equivalent of Elementary Arithmetic EA.
In order to relate ECA0 to the more classical systems we need to mention Σ
0
1–
bounding. The principle of Σ01–bounding is given by
∀x<a ∃z ϕ(x, y, z) → ∃b ∀x<a ∃ z<b ϕ(x, y, z)
with ϕ ∈ Σ01, and is also referred to as Σ
0
1 collection.
Lemma 3.2. The first-order part of ECA0 is EA and the first-order part of
RCA∗0 is EA plus Σ
0
1–bounding. Moreover, RCA
∗
0 is Π
0
2-conservative over ECA0
but not Σ02 conservative.
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Proof sketch. In [17] the above-mentioned characterization of the first-order part
of RCA0
∗ is proven.
If M is a model of EA then it is easy to check that 〈M, S〉 is a model of
ECA0, where S is the set of all ∆
0
0-definable subsets of M. This proves that the
first-order part of ECA0 is just EA.
It is well-known that EA plus Σ01 collection is Π
0
2 conservative over EA.
Moreover, the scheme of ∆01 minimal number principle is known to be Σ
0
2-
axiomatizable, provable from Σ01 collection over EA, but not provable in EA.
This establishes that Σ02 conservativity fails.
3.2 Transfinite induction and transfinite recursion
Another principle that will be relevant in this work is transfinite recursion, but
this is a bit more elaborate to describe. For simplicity let us assume that L2
contains only monadic set-variables. Binary relations and functions are repre-
sented by coding pairs of numbers. We shall establish a few conventions for
working with binary relations in second-order arithmetic.
We need to represent ordinals in second-order arithmetic. For this we will
view a set Λ as coding a pair 〈|Λ|, <Λ〉. As is standard, we write x <Λ y instead
of 〈x, y〉 ∈ <Λ. Let linear(Λ) be a formula naturally asserting that Λ is a
linearly ordered set, and define
wo(Λ) = linear(Λ)
∧ ∀X ⊆ |Λ|
(
∃x ∈ X → ∃y ∈ X ∀z ∈ X
(
y ≤Λ z
))
.
We will use lower-case Greek letters for elements of |Λ|, and boldface natural
numbers to denote finite ordinals, so that n is {0, . . . , n − 1} with the usual
ordering. When it is clear from context that we are working within Λ we may
write ξ < ζ instead of ξ <Λ ζ, and similarly write ξ < Λ instead of ξ ∈ |Λ|. A
boldface ω is the standard ordering on the naturals and a lightface ω denotes a
natural number with order-type ω within a larger ordinal.
We will say an ordinal Λ is additive if it comes equipped with a binary
operation +Λ : |Λ|
2 → |Λ| satisfying the usual rules of ordinal addition; as before
we may omit the subindex and just write α + β instead of α +Λ β. Note that
additive ordinals also admit multiplication by natural numbers. Some of our
results will be presented in additive ordinals, but this is not a problem over
theories extending ACA0 since one can readily replace Λ by ω
Λ, which will
remain provably well-ordered assuming that Λ is.
We are interested in the theory ATR0, in which new sets may be defined
using transfinite recursion. Transfinite recursion is the principle that sets may
be defined by iterating a formula along a well-order. To formalize this, let us
consider a set X whose elements are of the form 〈ξ, x〉. We shall write x ∈ Xξ
for 〈ξ, x〉 ∈ X .
Given a formula ϕ(X), define ϕ(X<Λλ) to be the formula where every occur-
rence of t ∈ X in ϕ is replaced by (t)0 <Λ λ ∧ t ∈ X . Then define TR
Λ(ϕ,X)
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to be the formula
∀ ξ < Λ ∀x
(
x ∈ Xξ ↔ ϕ(x,X<Λξ)
)
.
Finally, given a set of formulas Γ we define the schema
TR-Γ: ∀Λ
(
wo(Λ)→ ∃Y TRΛ(ϕ, Y )
)
for ϕ ∈ Γ.
We can now write down the axiom schema for Arithmetic Transfinite Recursion:
ATR0 : Q + Ind+TR-Π
0
ω.
The system ATR0 is commonly associated with Predicative Analysis and will
be the main focus of this paper.
In various proofs we will reason by induction along a well-order. By TIΛ(ϕ)
we denote the transfinite induction axiom for ϕ along the ordering <Λ:
TI
Λ(ϕ) :=
(
∀ ξ < Λ
(
∀ ζ <Λ ξ ϕ(ζ)→ ϕ(ξ)
))
→ ∀ ξ < Λ ϕ(ξ).
We will write ϕ-CA instead of {ϕ}-CA, i.e., the instance of the comprehension
axiom stating that {x | ϕ(x)} is a set. The following easy lemma tells us that
we have access to transfinite induction for formulas of the right complexity (see
[6]):
Lemma 3.3. In any second-order arithmetic theory containing predicate logic
we can prove
wo(Λ) ∧ (¬ϕ)-CA→ TIΛ(ϕ).
As an easy corollary to this lemma we see that in ACA0 we can apply
transfinite induction for arithmetic formulas and we shall use this time and
again in the remainder of this paper.
We finish this section some remarks on variations of ATR0. To start, we can
define Parameter-free Arithmetic Transfinite Recursion ATR−0 as:
ATR−0 : Q + Ind+∀Λ
(
wo(Λ)→ ∃Y TRΛ(ϕ, Y )
)
for ϕ ∈ Π0ω(Λ, Y ).
So, the only difference between ATR0 and ATR
−
0 is that in ATR0 we allow free
set parameters in ϕ other than Y and Γ while in ATR−0 we do not. We thank
Jeremy Avigad and Michael Rathjen for pointing out the following observation.
Theorem 3.4. ATR−0 ⊢ ATR0.
Proof. Reason in ATR0
−. We fix some Λ and assume wo(Λ). Now we wish to
prove transfinite induction for some ϕ(x, z,X, Y ) ∈ Π0ω(X,Y ); as always, we
may restrict ourselves to the case with just one additional set variable Y . Let
Y be arbitrary. Without loss of generality we may assume Y 6= ∅ so that we
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can fix some n0 ∈ Y . We now define Λ
′ := 〈|Λ′|,≺′〉 with |Λ′| := {〈x, y〉 | x ∈
|Λ| ∧ y ∈ Y } and ≺′ on |Λ′|2 as
〈x, y〉 ≺′ 〈x′, y′〉 :⇔ (x ≺ x′) ∨ (x = x′ ∧ y < y′).
Clearly, ≺′ defines a well-order if ≺ does. We now define ϕ′ to be obtained
from ϕ as follows: each occurrence of y ∈ Y is replaced by ∃x 〈x, y〉 ∈ |Λ′|;
each occurrence of x ≺ y is replaced by 〈x, n0〉 ≺ 〈y, n0〉; and each occurrence
of x ∈ |Λ| is replaced by 〈x, n0〉 ∈ |Λ
′|. It is easy to see that TRΛ
′
(ϕ′, X) →
TR
Λ(ϕ,X ;Y ). Since Y was arbitrary our result follows.
From private correspondence with Michael Rathjen we learned that one can
also consider a version of ATR0 where one restricts the well-orders to ones which
are definable via an arithmetical formula (allowing second-order parameters)
without losing proof-strength. However, if one makes this restriction on ATR−0
with moreover prohibiting set-parameters to occur in the arithmetical definition
of the well-order, then a genuinely weaker system is obtained. One can even
consider versions where no further first-order parameters are allowed as was
done for bar induction in [14].
4 Nested ω-rules for oracle provability
In this section, we will briefly discuss how nested ω-rules for oracle provability
can be formalized and prove certain basic properties of the formalization.
4.1 Formalizing nested ω-rules for oracle provability
We will use [λ]ΛTϕ to denote our representation of “ϕ is provable in T using one
application of an ω-rule of depth λ (according to <Λ)”. The desired recursion
for such a sequence of provability operators is given by the following equivalence:
[λ]ΛTϕ ↔
(
Tϕ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ<Λλ
(
∀n [ξ]ΛTψ(n) ∧ T (∀xψ(x)→ ϕ)
))
. (3)
In [6], two of the authors formalize a notion [λ]ΛTϕ in second-order number theory
so that under certain conditions it provably satisfies the recursion from (3).
In the current paper we will need to slightly modify (3) to oracle provabil-
ity. As such we will denote by [λ|X ]ΛTϕ the notion of iterated ω-rule oracle-
provability as defined by the following recursion.
[λ|X]ΛTϕ ↔
(
T |Xϕ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ<Λλ
(
∀n [ξ|X ]ΛTψ(n) ∧ T |X(∀xψ(x)→ ϕ)
))
(4)
The formalization of [λ|X ]ΛTϕ closely follows the presentation of [6]. For the
sake of clarity and keeping the paper self-contained we shall sketch here how
such a formalization would proceed and refer for [6] for further details.
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As a first step in such a formalization, we will use a set P as a “provability
operator for the oracle X”. Its elements are codes of pairs 〈λ, ϕ〉, with λ a code
for an ordinal and ϕ a code for a formula. We use [λ]Pϕ to denote 〈λ, ϕ〉 ∈ P .
The idea is that we want to consider those sets P of pairs 〈λ, ϕ〉 so that
(4) holds whenever we define [λ|X]ΛTϕ := 〈λ, ϕ〉 ∈ P . Of course, we will use
second-order logic to impose the necessary conditions on the set P . Whenever
P satisfies (4) we will write IPCΛT |X(P ) and say that “P is an iterated oracle
provability class”. The following definition is a minor modification from [6].
Definition 4.1. Let Λ denote a second-order variable that will be used to denote
a well-order. Define RuleΛT |X(d, ξ, λ, ψ, ϕ, P ) to be the formula
ξ<Λλ ∧ ∀n [ξ]Pψ(n˙) ∧ ProofT |X(d, ∀xψ(x)→ ϕ),
Proof
Λ
T |X(c, λ, ϕ, P ) to be
∃d ∃ξ ∃ψ
(
c = 〈d, ξ, ψ〉 ∧
[
ProofT |X(d, ϕ) ∨ Rule
Λ
T |X(d, ξ, λ, ψ, ϕ, P )
])
and let IPCΛ
T |X(P ) be the formula
∀λ ∈ |Λ| ∀ϕ
(
[λ]Pϕ↔ ∃c Proof
Λ
T |X(c, λ, ϕ, P )
)
.
Then, [λ|X ]ΛTϕ is the Π
1
1 formula ∀P (IPC
Λ
T |X(P ) → [λ]Pϕ), and 〈λ|X〉
Λ
Tϕ is
defined as ¬[λ|X ]ΛT¬ϕ.
Note that the formulas [λ]Pϕ and 〈λ〉Pϕ are independent of T , Λ and X and
are merely of complexity ∆00(P ). Note also that for c.e. theories T we have that
IPC
Λ
T |X(P ) is a Π
0
3(Λ, X, P ) formula.
We would like to stress that our notion of oracle provability is rather weak in
a sense: a formula is provable if it is a member of any iterated provability class
corresponding to that oracle, but it can be the case that there simply are no such
iterated provability classes. Consequently, and in the same sense, consistency
statements are rather strong: from oracle consistency we may conclude the
existence of an iterated provability class corresponding to that oracle. Let us
state this explicitly in a lemma whose proof merely follows from the definition.
Lemma 4.2. If T is any representable theory, then
ECA0 ⊢ ∀X
(
〈λ|X〉ΛT⊤ → ∃Y IPC
Λ
T |X(Y )
)
.
However, if we are mainly interested in consistency strength, it is not such a
bad thing to work under the assumption that iterated provability classes exists
for all oracles.
Lemma 4.3. Let T be a representable theory extending ECA0, then T and
T + ∀X ∃Y IPCΛ
T |X(Y ) are equiconsistent. That is,
T ≡Π01 T + ∀X ∃Y IPC
Λ
T |X(Y ).
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Proof. As in [6] we remark that T + T⊥ ⊢ T + ∀X ∃Y IPC
Λ
T |X(Y ) ⊢ T
and that T + T⊥ ≡Π01 T . To see the latter, suppose T ⊢ T⊥ → π of some
π ∈ Π01, then by provable Σ
0
1-completeness also T ⊢ Tπ → π whence by Lo¨b’s
rule, T ⊢ π.
4.2 Normality and completeness for oracle provability
Many results established in [6] for [λ]ΛTϕ simply carry over to [λ|X ]
Λ
Tϕ. For ex-
ample, via an easy transfinite recursion we see in ACA0 that iterated provability
classes are unique, given a well-order Λ and a c.e. base theory T .
Lemma 4.4. For T a c.e. theory, we have that
ACA0 + wo(Λ) ⊢ ∃≤1P IPC
Λ
T |X(P ),
where ∃≤1P ϕ(X) is an abbreviation of ∀P ∀P
′
(
ϕ(P ) ∧ ϕ(P ′)→ P ≡ P ′
)
.
As an immediate consequence of the definition, we trivially get monotonicity:
Lemma 4.5. It is provable in ECA0 that if Λ is a well-order and λ
′ <Λ λ then
[λ′|X]ΛTϕ→ [λ|X ]
Λ
Tϕ.
We also see that we have distributivity for our provability predicates [λ|X ]ΛT .
Lemma 4.6 (ACA0). Given a representable theory T , a well-order Λ, λ < Λ
and formulas ϕ1, ϕ2,
[λ|X ]ΛT (ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ ([λ|X ]
Λ
Tϕ1 → [λ|X ]
Λ
Tϕ2).
Proof. See [6]. Note that the addition of an oracle does not affect the proof.
Corollary 4.7. Within ACA0 + wo(Λ) the provability predicates [λ|X ]
Λ
T are
normal for each λ < Λ, provided EA ⊆ T .
We also can prove various completeness results for our provability predicates.
Lemma 4.8. If ϕ ∈ Σ02m+1(X, x) is arithmetic and m ≤ n then
ECA0 ⊢ ∀X ∀x
(
ϕ(X, x)→ [m|X ]nT ϕ(X, x˙)
)
. (5)
Proof. Reasoning in ECA0, we proceed by an external induction on m and the
subformulas of ϕ by their build; to be precise, assume (5) for each subformula
of ϕ. Without loss of generality we may assume that negations occur only on
atomic formulas, and that ϕ does not contain subformulas of the form ∀x∀y θ
or ∃x∃y θ where the occurrence of y is unbounded.
For the base case, ϕ is an atomic formula, which is of one of the following
forms: either it contains no second-order variables, in which case we obtain
Tϕ(x˙) by provable Σ
0
1-completeness. Otherwise, it is of the form t ∈ X or
t 6∈ X for some closed term t, which is provably equivalent to an axiom of T |X .
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If ϕ is bounded but not atomic, we merely follow a routine induction on the
build of ϕ. The case where ϕ is a Boolean combination of its subformulas is
straightforward, and bounded quantifiers may be dealt with in a standard way,
as for example in [8].
If ϕ = ∃x θ, then for some k we have that θ[x/k] is true and we may use
the induction hypothesis plus existential introduction. Finally, we consider the
case ϕ = ∀x θ. Since by assumption ∀x θ ∈ Σ02m+1 we have ∀x θ ∈ Π
0
2m
since it starts with a universal quantifier so that θ ∈ Σ02(m−1)+1. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis we have for every k that [m− 1|X ]nT θ(k) and therefore
[m¯|X ]nT∀x θ(x).
As an immediate corollary we get Π02m-completeness as well. We also getΣ
1
1-
completeness for provability involving at least ω-many iterations as is manifest
in the next theorem, provided we are allowed to pick a suitable oracle. We
will write [ω|X1, . . . , Xn]
Λ
T for oracle provability where the tuple X1, . . . , Xn is
represented by a single set using the conventions from Section 3.
Theorem 4.9 (ECA0). If ϕ(X, x) ∈ Σ
1
1(X) and ω ≤ Λ then
∀X ∃Y
(
ϕ(X, x)→ [ω|Y,X ]ΛT ϕ(X, x˙)
)
.
Proof. By assumption, ϕ(X, x) is of the form ∃Y ϕ0(Y,X, x) with the formula
ϕ0(Y,X, x) ∈ Π
0
ω(X,Y ). We now reason in ECA0, fix some X and x and assume
ϕ(X, x). Thus, for some Y we have ϕ0(Y,X, x). By Lemma 4.8 above together
with monotonicity (Lemma 4.5) we see that [ω|Y,X ]ΛT ϕ0(Y ,X, x˙) whence also
[ω|Y,X ]ΛT ϕ(X, x˙).
5 Oracle consistency and oracle reflection
In this section we shall define the notions of reflection and consistency that
naturally correspond to oracle provability. Moreover, we shall link the two
notions to each other and see how they relate to comprehension.
5.1 Oracle consistency versus oracle reflection
Definition 5.1 (Oracle reflection and oracle consistency). For T a c.e. theory
and Γ a class of formulas not containing any occurrence of O, we define λ-
OracleRFN
Λ
T [Γ] (oracle reflection) as the schema
∀X1 . . . ∀Xn ∀x
(
[λ|X1, . . . , Xn]
Λ
T ϕ(X1, . . . , Xn, x˙)→ ϕ(X1, . . . , Xn, x)
)
for ϕ(X1, . . . , Xn, x) ∈ Γ and FV(ϕ(X1, . . . , Xn, x)) ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xn, x}. We
define λ-OracleConsΛT as λ-OracleRFN
Λ
T [{⊥}].
The next easy example makes clear why we imposed the restriction of O not
occurring in Γ. Let X := {2} and let Y := ∅. Clearly we have [λ|X ]ΛTO(2)
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and [λ|Y ]ΛT¬O(2) so that we arise at a contradiction were we allowed to apply
oracle reflection to these sentences. We shall later see that oracle reflection with
the restriction is consistent. Let us first see how consistency and reflection are
easily related to each other.
Lemma 5.2. Let m > n denote natural numbers and let Λ > λ ≥ ω denote
ordinals. Over ECA0 we have
1. n-OracleRFNmECA0 [Π
0
2n+1] ≡ n-OracleCons
m
ECA0
;
2. λ-OracleRFNΛECA0 [Π
1
1] ≡ λ-OracleCons
Λ
ECA0
.
Proof. For the first item, it should be clear that n-OracleRFNmECA0 [Π
0
2n+1] ⊢
n-OracleConsmECA0 ; but by Σ
0
2n+1 completeness of [n|X ]
m
T provability as ex-
pressed in Lemma 4.8, the latter also implies the former and all three are equiv-
alent. For the third item this follows from Σ11-completeness (Theorem 4.9). One
has to check that the second-order quantifier from oracle provability does not
essentially change the proof compared to Lemma 1.4.
5.2 Oracle reflection and comprehension
We shall now see that with just a little amount of reflection we get arithmetical
comprehension.
Lemma 5.3. ACA0 ⊆ ECA0 + 0-OracleRFN
1
ECA0
[Σ01].
Proof. Let ~X be a sequence of second-order variables X1, . . . , Xn all different
from Y . We only need to prove Σ01-CA, which really amounts to ∀
~X ∃Y ∀y (y ∈
Y ↔ ϕ(x, ~X)) where ϕ(x, ~X) can be any formula in Σ01( ~X). Let ϕ˜(x,X) arise
from ϕ(x, ~X) by replacing each occurrence of x ∈ Xi by 〈i, x〉 ∈ X . Clearly ϕ˜
is still a Σ01 formula and ϕ-CA is provably equivalent to ϕ˜-CA so that we may
restrict our proof to formulas with a single free set parameter.
Fix some set X . Since reflection implies consistency we know that there is
some iterated provability predicate for X (Lemma 4.2). That is, there is some
P with IPC1ECA0|X(P ) and moreover, since 1 is provably well-founded we know
that P is unique (Lemma 4.4). Let ϕ(x,X) be a Σ01(X) formula. By ∆
0
0-CA we
can form the set
Z = {z | [0|X ]P ϕ(z,X)}.
We claim that z ∈ Z ↔ ϕ(z,X) which finishes the proof. If z ∈ Z, then by the
uniqueness of P we get [0|X ]1ECA0ϕ(z,X), whence by reflection ϕ(z,X). On the
other hand, if ϕ(z,X) we get by completeness (Lemma 4.8) that [0|X ]1ECA0ϕ(z,X)
so that z ∈ Z.
The upshot of this lemma is that we can perform many of our arguments in
ACA0 once we have just a little bit of reflection.
16
6 Predicative reflection and consistency
Our notions of oracle reflection and oracle consistency depended on a particular
well-order Λ. We shall now define what we call predicative oracle reflection
and predicative oracle consistency which stipulate the oracle notions for any
well-order.
Definition 6.1. We define the principle predicative oracle reflection
Pred-O-RFNT [Γ] = ∀Λ ∀λ ∈ |Λ|
(
wo(Λ)→ λ-OracleRFNΛT [Γ]
)
,
and predicative oracle consistency
Pred-O-Cons(T ) = ∀Λ ∀λ ∈ |Λ|
(
wo(Λ)→ λ-OracleConsΛT
)
.
Let us first make a simple observation.
Lemma 6.2. ECA0 ⊢ Pred-O-Cons(ECA0)↔ Pred-O-RFNECA0 [Π
1
1].
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 5.2.
The main result of this section is that predicative analysis follows from pred-
icative oracle consistency over a rather weak theory. To be more precise, we shall
prove that ATR0 follows from ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0). In order to prove
this we first shall first analyze ATR0 in more detail.
6.1 Predicative Analysis revisited
Let us recall from Section 3.2 the formula TRΛ(ϕ,X) which says that the set
X satisfies transfinite recursion for ϕ over the well-order Λ. If ϕ is arithmetical,
then so is TRΛ(ϕ,X). Moreover, we note that TRΛ(ϕ,X) only imposes restric-
tions on numbers which code pairs 〈ξ, n〉 with ξ ∈ |Λ| and says nothing about
numbers not of this form.
In order to prove properties of transfinite recursion it will be useful to have
restricted versions of TRΛ(ϕ,X) whence we define
TR
Λ
λ(ϕ,X) := ∀ ξ ≤Λ λ∀x
(
x ∈ Xξ ↔ ϕ(x,X<Λξ)
)
and TRΛ<λ(ϕ,X) := ∀ ξ <Λ λ TR
Λ
λ (ϕ,X). The formula ϕ may have many free
number and set variables. However, one set variable of ϕ plays a special role in
TR
Λ(ϕ,X), like the variable X in TRΛλ(ϕ,X) above. We call this the recursion
variable.
Sometimes we may wish to emphasize that TRΛλ (ϕ, Y ) has other free variables
appearing in ϕ. We will do so by using a semicolon as in TRΛλ(ϕ, Y ;X). We
stipulate that any first-order variable, say z, in TRΛλ(ϕ, Y ; z) will be dotted when
occurring under a box. Thus if, for example z is free in ϕ, then TRΛλ (ϕ,X) means
TR
Λ
λ(ϕ,X ; z) and by definition [ξ|Λ]
Λ
TTR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ, Y ) will denote [ξ|Λ]ΛTTR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ, Y ; z˙).
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By convention we shall write the number variable which is universally quanti-
fied in TRΛλ (ϕ,X) (x in the above formulation) as the first in the list of variables.
By ≡<Λξ we will denote set equality up to ξ, that is
X ≡<Λξ Y := ∀ ζ<Λξ ∀x
(
〈ζ, x〉 ∈ X ↔ 〈ζ, x〉 ∈ Y
)
.
If the context allows us to, we shall simply write X ≡ξ Y instead of X ≡<Λξ Y .
Let us dwell for a moment on how we can see the veracity of ATR0 within
second-order arithmetic. Given an arithmetical formula ϕ, could we directly
define a set X so that TRΛ(ϕ,X)?
Second-order arithmetic does not directly allow transfinite recursive defini-
tions as in TRΛ(ϕ,X), so that we cannot defineXξ out ofX<ξ outright. However,
we know that given a formula ϕ the set A such that TRΛ(ϕ,A) holds is uniquely
determined up to Λ. In particular, any initial part A<ξ is unique so that in-
stead of recursively calling upon A<ξ we may use any set satisfying the defining
properties so that the recursion is mimicked by a universal set quantifier. This
reasoning can be formalized in ACA0 for arithmetical ϕ:
Lemma 6.3. Let ϕ ∈ Π0ω be arithmetical. We have that
ACA0 ⊢ wo(Λ) → ∀λ ≤Λ Λ
(
TR
Λ
<λ(ϕ,X) ∧ TR
Λ
<λ(ϕ, Y ) → X ≡λ Y
)
.
Proof. Reason in ACA0 and assume wo(Λ). The claim follows by transfinite
induction on the arithmetical formula TRΛ<λ(ϕ,X) ∧ TR
Λ
<λ(ϕ, Y ) → X ≡λ
Y .
The unicity proved by this lemma justifies the following definition.
Definition 6.4.
T̂R
Λ
λ (ϕ,X) := ∀x
(
x0 ≤Λ λ→
[
x ∈ X ↔ ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y )→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)])
In particular, ACA0 can prove that T̂R and TR are equivalent on arithmetical
formulas.
Lemma 6.5. Let ϕ ∈ Π0ω be arithmetical. We have that
ACA0 ⊢ wo(Λ) → ∀λ < Λ
(
T̂R
Λ
λ(ϕ,X) ↔ TR
Λ
λ (ϕ,X)
)
.
Proof. Reason in ACA0 and assume wo(Λ). The implication TR
Λ
λ (ϕ,X) →
T̂R
Λ
λ(ϕ,X) follows directly from Lemma 6.3. For the other direction, assume
T̂R
Λ
λ(ϕ,X) and prove by induction on ξ ≤ λ that TR
Λ
ξ (ϕ,X).
As a corollary we see that ATR0 follows from Π
1
1 comprehension.
Corollary 6.6. ECA0 +Π
1
1-CA ⊢ ATR0
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Proof. Given some Λ with wo(Λ), by Π11-CA we can form the set{
x | x0 ∈ |Λ| ∧ ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y )→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)}
.
The proof of this corollary reveals our proof strategy to see that ATR0 is
provable from the predicative consistency of ECA0. If we have sufficient com-
pleteness and soundness, we can replace ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y ;X) → ϕ(x1, Y<x0 , X)
)
in the comprehension axiom by
∃ ξ < Λ [ξ|Λ, X ]ΛT
(
∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y ;X)→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0 , X)
)
. (6)
At first sight, this does not seem much of an improvement since [ξ|Λ]ΛTχ is Π
1
1
too: ∀Z(IPCΛ
T |Λ(Z) → [ξ]Zχ). However, under sufficient assumptions we can
replace this by [ξ]Pχ for a particular iterated provability class P . Note that
[ξ]Pχ is a ∆
0
0 formula! Moreover, we shall see that we can estimate the needed
ξ in (6) from x so that we can even dispense of the existential quantifier in (6).
A key ingredient that explains why this strategy will work over ACA0 is that
transfinite induction up to λ < Λ can be mimicked in ECA0 by an omega-rule
of nesting at most λ as illustrated by the next lemma. Just as for transfinite
recursion, let us consider restricted versions of transfinite induction:
TI
Λ
λ(ϕ) :=
(
∀ ξ <Λ λ
(
∀ ζ <Λ ξ ϕ(ζ)→ ϕ(ξ)
))
→ ∀ ξ ≤Λ λ ϕ(ξ).
Although ECA0 cannot prove transfinite induction for arithmetical formulas,
ACA0 can prove that ECA0 can prove it up to certain externally determined
levels.
Lemma 6.7. Let ϕ ∈ Π0ω(Λ, X) be an arithmetical formula. We have that
ACA0 ⊢ wo(Λ)→ ∀λ < Λ [λ|Λ, X ]
Λ
ECA0TI
Λ
ω·λ˙
(
ϕ(X)
)
.
Proof. Reason in ACA0 and assume wo(Λ). Either there are no IPCs and the
claim holds trivially, or there is a unique IPC, say P , and we prove ∀λ <
Λ [λ|Λ, X ]PTI
Λ
ω·λ˙
(
ϕ(X)
)
by an easy induction on λ.
As a consequence, even though ECA0 cannot prove uniqueness as in Lemma
6.3 nor the equivalence of T̂R
Λ
λ(ϕ,X) and TR
Λ
λ(ϕ,X) as in Lemma 6.5, under a
box ECA0 can prove these facts:
Corollary 6.8. Let ϕ ∈ Π0ω(Λ, X) be an arithmetical formula. We have that
1. ACA0 ⊢wo(Λ)→
∀λ < Λ [λ|Λ, X ]ΛECA0
(
TR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ, Y ;X) ∧ TRΛ
λ˙
(ϕ,Z;X)→ Y ≡λ˙ Z
)
;
2. ACA0 ⊢wo(Λ)→
∀λ≤ΛΛ [λ|Λ, X ]
Λ
ECA0
(
T̂R
Λ
λ˙ (ϕ, Y ;X) ↔ TR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ, Y ;X)
)
.
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Proof. Directly from Lemmas 6.7, 6.5 and 6.3. Note that neither proof uses
arithmetical comprehension but rather proceeds by transfinite induction. Clearly,
one can bound the amount of transfinite induction by λ.
We will now see that finite versions of transfinite recursion do not exceed
the realm of ACA0. For ϕ(x,X) ∈ Π
0
ω let us recursively define ϕ
(0)(x) := ⊥
and ϕ(n+1)(x,X) := ϕ(x, y ∈ X/ϕ(n)(y)). Thus, in the inductive step, we
substitute any occurrence of y ∈ X by ϕ(n)(y). Note that x and y are meant
to be metavariables here and in particular we allow x = y. In a sense, these
formulas ϕ(n+1)(x) tell all there is to know about finite recursion.
Lemma 6.9. Let ϕ(X) ∈ Π0ω be arithmetical. For each n ∈ ω we have that for
any well-order Λ with order type provably at least n+ 1 that
ECA0 ⊢
∨
m≤n
(
x0=m ∧ ϕ
(m+1)(x1)
)
←→ ∀X
(
TR
Λ
n+1(ϕ,X) ∧ x ∈ X<n+1
)
.
Proof. By a simple external induction on n.
As a consequence, we can prove a weak version of completeness for second-
order information as is expressed in the next lemma.
Lemma 6.10. Let ϕ ∈ Π0m(X,Y,Λ) with m > 0 and ψ(X,Y,Λ) ∈ Π
0
l (X,Y,Λ)
be arithmetical. For any natural number n > 0 we have that
1. ECA0 ⊢wo(Λ) → ∀X
((
TR
Λ
n(ϕ,X) ∧ x ∈ X<n
)
→
[m · n|Y,Λ]ΛECA0∀X
(
TR
Λ
n(ϕ,X ;Y )→ x˙ ∈ X<n
))
and more generally,
2. ECA0 ⊢wo(Λ) →
((
TR
Λ
n(ϕ,X) ∧ ψ(X<n)
)
→
[m · n+ l|Y,Λ]ΛECA0∀X
(
TR
Λ
n(ϕ,X ;Y )→ ψ(X<n, Y ,Λ)
))
.
Proof. It is easy to see that given ϕ ∈ Π0m, the formula ϕ
(n+1) ∈ Σ0m·n+2. Thus,
given TRΛn(ϕ,X) inside ECA0, we can switch to the first-order equivalent as given
by Lemma 6.9 with low enough complexity so that by provable completeness
(Lemma 4.8) we obtain this first-order equivalence under the box. Since under
the box the sets X that satisfy TRΛn(ϕ,X) are unique we obtain the required
result.
In the next subsection we shall see that the above lemma can simply be
extended to transfinite values of n. Clearly, the route via a first-order equivalent
of TRΛn(ϕ,X) will no longer work. However, it should not come as a surprise
that the lemma can nonetheless be generalized since ω-rules do provide us with
a means to talk about infinite conjunctions and disjunctions in a sense.
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6.2 Predicative consistency proves predicative analysis
In the previous subsection we sketched a strategy for how to prove ATR0 from
the predicative consistency of ECA0. Thus, we would like to conclude that,
given x0 and x1 there exists ξ = ξ(x0, x1) such that the set
{x | x0 ∈ |Λ| ∧ [ξ|Λ]
Λ
T ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y )→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)
}.
is equal –provably in ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0)– to the set
{x | x0 ∈ |Λ| ∧ ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y )→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)
}.
One inclusion turns out to be provable, in ACA0, but not the other. However,
we shall see that we can prove something very similar to equality.
First, we shall prove a lemma which gives us an estimate for ξ(x0, x1). Note
that by Σ11-completeness we have that ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0) proves
[ξ(x0, x1)|Λ]
Λ
T ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y )→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)
→
∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y )→ ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)
.
The converse of this implication need not be provable in ACA0 since the an-
tecedent ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
x0
(ϕ, Y ) → ϕ(x1, Y<x0)
)
is trivially satisfied when there is no
such Y at all. However, we can prove this implication if we know that at least
one Y exists satisfying TRΛx0(ϕ, Y ). The next lemma tells us so, and gives us a
concrete bound on ξ(x0, x1). The lemma is a generalization of the finite case as
proven in Lemma 6.10.
Lemma 6.11 (ACA0). Let Λ be an additive ordinal and let ϕ ∈ Π
0
m(X,Z,Λ)
and ψ ∈ Π0ℓ(X,Z,Λ). Then,
wo(Λ) → ∀Z,X, λ < Λ
(
TR
Λ
<λ(ϕ,Z) ∧ ψ(Z<λ)
→ [m·λ+ ℓ|X,Λ]ΛT ∀Z
(
TR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ,Z;X)→ ψ(Z<λ˙, X,Λ)
))
.
Proof. We reason in ACA0, assume wo(Λ), fix Z and X and proceed to prove
that the claim simultaneously for all subformulas of ϕ and of ψ. We use (an
arithmetical) induction on λ with a subsidiary external induction on the build
of ψ. The subsidiary induction on ψ simply follows the proof of Lemma 4.8. We
only have to consider two new base cases.
First we consider the case when ψ is of the form x0<Λλ ∧ x ∈ Z in which
case we have that x0 <Λ λ is simply an axiom of T |X,Λ. Meanwhile, by the
assumption that x ∈ Z and TRΛλ(ϕ,Z) we must have that both ϕ(x1, Z<x0 , X)
and TRΛx0(ϕ,Z) are true and by the induction hypothesis applied to x0 we have
that
[m · x0 +m|X,Λ]
Λ
T ∀Z
(
TR
Λ
x˙0
(ϕ,Z;X)→ ϕ(x˙1, Z<x˙0, X,Λ)
)
.
Since Λ is additive, we have that m · x0 + m ∈ |Λ|. Since x0 + 1 ≤ λ it now
immediately follows that
[m · λ|X,Λ]ΛT ∀Z
(
TR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ,Z;X)→ (x˙0 <Λ λ˙ ∧ x˙ ∈ Z)
)
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as was to be shown. The case where ψ = ¬(x0<Λλ∧x ∈ Z) is proven similarly.
In the light of this lemma it makes sense to consider the following definition.
Definition 6.12. Let ϕ ∈ Π0m(W,X,Λ) be arithmetical. We define a formula
T˜R
Λ
λ(ϕ,A) by
∀x
(
x0 ≤Λ λ→
(
x ∈ A
↔ [m · x0|W,Λ]
Λ
T ∀X
(
TR
Λ
<x˙0
(ϕ,X ;W )→ ϕ(x˙1, X<x˙0 ,W ,Λ)
)))
.
We also define T˜R
Λ
<λ(ϕ,A) by ∀η <Λ λ T˜R
Λ
η (ϕ,A) and T˜R
Λ
Λ(ϕ,A) by ∀λ <
Λ T˜R
Λ
η (ϕ,A)
The notion of T˜R
Λ
λ (ϕ,A) will be useful to us because, as we will see later, it
is equivalent to TRΛλ (ϕ,A); however, we only need reflection to construct a set
satisfying T˜R
Λ
λ(ϕ,A).
Lemma 6.13. Let ϕ ∈ Π0ω(X,Y,Λ) be arithmetical. We have that
ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0) ⊢ wo(Λ)→ ∀X∃Y T˜R
Λ
(ϕ, Y ;X).
Proof. Since ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0) ⊢ ACA0 we know that any IPC will
be unique given a well-order Λ. So, we reason in ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0),
assume wo(Λ) and pick X arbitrary as well as λ ∈ |Λ|. By [0|X,Λ]ΛECA0⊥ → ⊥
we observe that ∃P IPCΛECA0|X,Λ(P ).
So let P be such an IPC and consider the set
Y := {〈λ, x〉 | λ ∈ |Λ| ∧ [nλ|X,Λ]ΛP ∀Y
(
TR
Λ
λ˙
(ϕ, Y ;X)→ ϕ(x˙, Y<λ˙, X,Λ)
)
}.
By ∆00-comprehension Y is a set and by definition and the uniqueness of an
IPC we conclude that T˜RΛ(Z|X).
Lemma 6.14. For ϕ ∈ Π0ω(W,X,Λ) it is provable in ECA0+Pred-O-Cons(ECA0)
that if A,W are sets and Λ is a well-order then T˜R
Λ
(ϕ,A) implies that TRΛ(ϕ,A).
Proof. We will prove the more general claim that T˜R
Λ
λ (ϕ,A) implies that TR
Λ
λ(ϕ,A)
for all λ < Λ. Fix Λ, A,W and ϕ and proceed by transfinite induction on λ < Λ.
Note that since all sets are fixed, this induction can be done in ACA0.
So, assume that T˜R
Λ
λ (ϕ,A) holds and, by induction, that for all η < λ,
TR
Λ
η (ϕ,A). Suppose that x = 〈η, n〉 with η ≤ λ. If η < λ, then we already have
TR
Λ
η (ϕ,A) by the induction hypothesis, and thus ∀x
(
x ∈ A ↔ ϕ(x,A<η)
)
, so
we may assume η = λ.
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If x ∈ A, it is immediate byΠ11-reflection that ∀X
(
TR
Λ
<λ(ϕ,X)→ ϕ(n,X<λ)
)
.
But by the induction hypothesis, TRΛ<λ(ϕ,A) holds; therefore, in particular,
ϕ(n,A<λ) holds as well.
Conversely, if we have that ϕ(n,A<λ), we wish to appeal to Lemma 6.11 to
conclude that x ∈ A. By the induction hypothesis, A<λ satisfies TR
Λ
<λ(ϕ,A<λ).
Thus from Lemma 6.11, there is m ∈ N such that
[m · x0|W,Λ]
Λ
T ∀X
(
TR
Λ
<x˙0
(ϕ,X ;W )→ ϕ(x˙1, X<x˙0,W ,Λ)
)
,
and hence x ∈ A. But we have now shown that, for all x = 〈η, n〉 with η ≤ λ,
x ∈ A↔ ϕ(n,A<η), that is, TR
Λ
λ(ϕ,A).
We can now finally combine all our previous results and formulate the main
theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.15. ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0) ⊢ ATR0.
Proof. Since ECA0 + Pred-O-Cons(ECA0) ⊢ ACA0 we have access to all the
reasoning over ACA0 and the result follows immediately from Lemmas 6.13 and
6.14.
7 Countable coded ω-models and reflection
Our goal in this section is to derive a converse of Theorem 6.15; in fact, we
will even show that ATR0 extends Pred-O-RFNACA[Π
1
2]. The main tool for this
task will be the notion of a countable coded ω–model. In what follows we shall
discuss existence results for ω–models and the satisfaction definitions associated
to them. First we briefly recall the definition and basic properties of these
models (we refer to [16, chapters VII and VIII] for a more detailed account of
this topic).
7.1 ω–Models and satisfaction definitions
Let us denote by L1 the language of first-order arithmetic. A structure for L2,
M = 〈N,S〉, is given by an L1–structure N together with a family S of subsets
of the universe of N. An ω–model is just an L2–structure M = 〈N,S〉 where
N is the standard L1–structure with universe ω. Therefore, in order to fully
describe an ω–model it is enough to provide a subset S of P(ω). This motivates
the following definition within RCA0.
Definition 7.1 (RCA0). A countable coded ω–model is a set M ⊆ N viewed
as a code for a countable sequence of subsets of N, {Mn | n ∈ N}, where for
each n ∈ N, Mn = {i | 〈n, i〉 ∈M}.
A satisfaction notion can be associated to each countable coded ω–model in
a rather natural way. To this end we introduce some auxiliary concepts.
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Working in RCA0, for each countable coded ω–model M, we denote by LC
the language obtained by adding to L2 two sequences of new constant symbols:
{cn | n ∈ N} and {Cn | n ∈ N}.
The constants Cn are second-order and are used as names for the sets of the
sequence coded by M. On the other hand each constant cn will be interpreted
as n, so by primitive recursion it can be shown within RCA0 that there is a
function val : TrmC → N that associates to each closed first-order term t of LC
its value val(t) under the usual interpretation for the symbols of LC .
Now, always working within RCA0, let SntC denote the set of sentences of
LC . In what follows, Γ will denote a set of LC–formulas closed under taking
subformulas and substituting terms.
Definition 7.2 (RCA0). Let M be a countable coded ω–model. A (full) sat-
isfaction definition for M is a set Sat ⊆ LC which obeys the usual recursive
clauses of Tarski’s truth definition, where each constant cn is interpreted as n
and constants Cn are interpreted using Mn. In particular, for every t ∈ TrmC
and n ∈ N,
(t ∈ Cn) ∈ Sat ⇔ val(t) ∈Mn;
(¬ϕ) ∈ Sat ⇔ ϕ 6∈ Sat;
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∈ Sat ⇔ ϕ1 ∈ Sat and ϕ2 ∈ Sat;
(∀uϕ(u)) ∈ Sat ⇔ for all n ∈ N, ϕ(cn) ∈ Sat;
(∀X ϕ(X)) ∈ Sat ⇔ for all n ∈ N, ϕ(Mn) ∈ Sat.
We may assume other Booleans and quantifiers are defined in terms of ¬,∧, ∀.
We say that M is a full ω–model if there exists a full satisfaction definition for
M.
It can be shown in RCA0 that ifM is a countable coded ω–model, then there
exists a (unique) partial satisfaction definition for ∆00-formulas in M (that is,
more complex formulas are not necessarily assigned a truth value). Nevertheless,
existence of full satisfaction definition requires a stronger theory, such as ATR0;
uniqueness, on the other hand, does not require such a strong base theory.
Lemma 7.3 (RCA0). Let M be a countable coded ω–model. Then, there is at
most one full satisfaction definition in M.
Definition 7.4 (RCA0). Let M be a countable coded ω–model and let ϕ be
a sentence of LC . We say that M is a full ω–model of ϕ if there is a full
satisfaction definition Sat in M such that ϕ ∈ Sat, in which case we write
M |= ϕ. We say that M is a model of a set of formulas Φ of LC if, for every
θ ∈ Φ, M is a model of the universal closure of θ.
Lemma 7.5. Let ϕ(X1, . . . , Xm, v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Π
0
∞(X1, . . . , Xm) with all vari-
ables shown. We have that RCA0 proves:
For every full countable coded ω–model M and natural numbers a1, . . . , an,
b1, . . . , bm, we have that ϕ(Ma1 , . . . ,Man , b1, . . . , bm) holds if and only if M
satisfies ϕ(Ca1 , . . . , Can , cb1 , . . . , cbm).
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Proof. Straightforward by (external) induction on the syntactical complexity of
the formula ϕ, using the Tarskian truth conditions.
Lemma 7.6 (RCA0). Let M be a full countable coded ω–model. Then,
M |= Q+ IΣ1ω.
Proof. Reasoning in RCA0, let Sat denote a partial satisfaction definition for Γ
in M.
Since Q is axiomatized by true Π01–formulas, it follows from Lemma 7.5 that
M |= Q. Now let ϕ(u,X) ∈ Γ such that for some b,
M |= ϕ(0,Mb) ∧ ∀u
(
ϕ(u,Mb)→ ϕ(u+ 1,Mb)
)
.
Then
θ(0, b, ϕ, Sat) ∧ ∀x
(
θ(x, b, ϕ, Sat)→ θ(x+ 1, b, ϕ, Sat)
)
,
where θ(x, b, ϕ, Sat) is the ∆01–formula ϕ(cx, Cb) ∈ Sat. Since RCA0 contains Σ
0
1
induction we see that ∀x θ(x, b, ϕ, Sat) and, as a consequence,M |= ∀uϕ(u,Mb).
7.2 ω–Models of ACA0
The following result will be very useful to us; see [16, Theorem VIII.1.13].
Proposition 7.7 (ATR0). For each X ⊆ N there exists a unique, smallest, full
countable coded ω-model M such that X ∈M and M |= ACA0. We will denote
this model by M[X ].
In view of Lemma 7.6, we immediately obtain the following:
Corollary 7.8 (ATR0). Proposition 7.7 remains true if we replace ACA0 by
ACA (with full induction). In fact, we already have that M[X ] |= ACA.
Previous results on countable coded ω–models can be extended to theories
with an oracle as described at the end of Section 1. We only must fix the
interpretation of the oracle. For each countable coded ω–model we will adopt
the following convenion: the oracle O will always be interpreted using M0.
Similarly, we can assume that in M[X ], we have X = M0.
Lemma 7.9 (ω–model soundness). The following is provable in ATR0. Suppose
that T is representable, X ⊆ N, Λ is a well-order, M is a full ω-model for T
with M0 ≡ X and λ ∈ |Λ| is such that [λ|X ]
Λ
Tϕ. Then, M |= ϕ.
Proof. Let us fix a full satisfaction definition in M, Sat, and let P be an iterated
provability class for T . Then it is enough to show that
∀X ∀λ < Λ ∀ϕ
(
[λ]Pϕ→ ϕ ∈ Sat
)
.
But this can be easily derived by fixing X and proving by transfinite induction
that we have
∀λ < Λ ∀ϕ
(
[λ]Pϕ→ ϕ ∈ Sat
)
.
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7.3 Proving predicative reflection
We are almost ready to state and prove our main theorem. We only need to
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7.10. Let T ⊆ L2 be any formal theory such that it is provable in
ATR0 that every set X can be included in a full ω-model for T . Then, ATR0 ⊢
Pred-O-RFNT [Π
1
2].
Proof. Work in ATR0. Let Λ be such that wo(Λ); we must show that
∀λ ∈ |Λ|, λ-OracleRFNΛACA[Π
1
2].
Let ϕ(X, x) ∈ Π12 be such that for some set A ⊆ N, a ∈ N and λ ∈ |Λ|,
[λ|A]ΛTϕ(A¯, a˙). Since ϕ(X, x) ∈ Π
1
2, we can assume that ϕ(X, x) is of the form
∀Y ∃Z θ(X,Y, Z, x) for some formula θ(X,Y, Z, x) ∈ Π0ω.
Let B ⊆ N. We shall show that θ(A,B,C, a) holds for some set C. It follows
from [λ|A]ΛTϕ(A¯, a˙), that [λ|A,B]
Λ
T ∃Z θ(A¯, B¯, Z, a˙). Hence, since we are working
in ATR0, there exists the least countable coded ω–model M = M[A,B] of T
containing A and B, so that A = M0 and B = M1. By ω–model soundness,
M |= ∃Z θ(A¯, B¯, Z, ca), and, since B was arbitrary, we conclude that ϕ is true.
We may now summarize our results in our main theorem.
Theorem 7.11. Let U, T be computably enumerable theories such that ECA0 ⊆
U ⊆ ATR0, ECA0 ⊆ T and such that ATR0 proves that any set X can be
included in a full ω-model for T . Then,
ATR0 ≡ U + Pred-O-Cons(T ) ≡ U + Pred-O-RFNT [Π
1
2]. (7)
Proof. It is obvious that the third theory is at least as strong as the second, and
the other inclusions are Theorem 6.15 and Lemma 7.10.
The following is then immediate in view of Corollary 7.8:
Corollary 7.12. Let G = {ECA0,RCA
∗
0,RCA0,ACA0}. Then, (7) holds when-
ever U ∈ G ∪ {ATR0} and T ∈ G ∪ {ACA}.
Although the following is well-known, it is an interesting consequence of our
main result:
Corollary 7.13. ATR0 is finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Immediate from Theorems 3.1 and Corollary 7.12 setting U = T =
ACA0.
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